Three important interconnected spheres shape women's lives in Tunisia: marriage, fertility and agency over their lives and those of their families. This paper focuses on the forces that shape women's choices and the patterns of their lives and how these choices and patterns have evolved over time. Specifically, the paper examines marriage decisions, such as whether and at what age women marry and what living arrangements they adopt at marriage. We also investigate the crucial decisions women and their husbands make vis-à-vis procreation, along with fertility correlates such as age and education level. Finally, we examine the scope of women's agency over a variety of decisions, as well as the links between women's employment and marital status. Relying on the Tunisia Labor Market Panel Survey (TLMPS) 2014 data, this paper highlights differences between urban and rural areas, different regions in Tunisia, and across women of different socio-economic statuses.
Introduction
Tunisian women have made substantial progress in recent years in gaining greater control over aspects of their lives that affect their own wellbeing and that of their families (Chambers & Cummings, 2014) . As we have seen in Assaad, Ghazouani, and Krafft (2016) , Tunisian women are increasingly educated, with the educational attainment of young women now exceeding that of young men. Nearly one third of Tunisian women born since 1990 are obtaining higher education compared to less than 25 percent of men in the same cohort (Assaad, Hendy, Lassasi, & Yassine, 2016) . These educational shifts have contributed to changes in the institution of marriage in Tunisia. As we show in this paper, women are marrying later and are likely to be living in more autonomous nuclear family arrangements upon marriage. Women are also marrying men who are either equally educated or less educated than themselves, although the spousal age gap has been quite persistent at 5-6 years.
As in many other societies, marriage in Tunisia is a major watershed moment for women's economic participation. Marriage is associated with a substantial increase in domestic and reproductive work burdens, reducing women's ability to participate in market work. Although we find that women's participation in public sector work and in non-wage work is not substantially affected by marriage, women tend to leave private sector wage work upon marriage. However, in contrast to Egypt and Jordan, where women do not return to private sector wage work even when their children are older (Assaad, Krafft, & Selwaness, 2016) , women in Tunisia do return to it, with rates of private sector wage work recovering to their pre-marital levels after 8 years of marriage.
These fundamental changes in educational attainment and in the patterns of marriage and women's work in Tunisia have occurred along with a far-reaching demographic transition where fertility declined from six children per woman to two children per woman from the late 1970s to the early 2000s. The shift towards urban living in Tunisia, 1 the rapidly rising education levels, and the rising desire on the part of Tunisian women to participate economically 2 may push fertility even lower in the future.
Together, all of these trends are changing gender relations within the home in Tunisia. Women who are as educated or more educated than their husbands, who are older at marriage, and who participate economically are likely to have more say in fertility and in other household decisions. While we are not able to track the trend in women's agency in Tunisia given that the data we have on these issues is only at one point in time, we can in fact show that women's agency increases with urban residence, the socio-economic status of the household, and with women's education. Thus, we would expect demographic and educational changes to have contributed to changes in agency over time.
In what follows we begin by discussing the data, sample, and methods used. Subsequently, we present our results on changing patterns of marriage in Tunisia (Section 3), the trends and patterns of fertility (Section 4) and the patterns of decision-making and mobility among Tunisian women (Section 5). Section 6 concludes.
Data and Methods
This paper analyzes a number of important dimensions of women's wellbeing in Tunisia using the Tunisia Labor Market Panel Survey (TLMPS) 2014. The TLMPS is a nationally representative survey that was carried out by the Economic Research Forum (ERF) in collaboration with the Tunisian National Institute of Statistics (INS). The data are publicly available from ERF (OAMDI, 2016a) . Throughout, sample weights are used to ensure representativeness. For more information on the survey see Assaad, Ghazouani, Krafft, and Rolando (2016) . The methods used throughout this paper are all descriptive in nature.
A number of different transitions shape the course of women's lives. We focus, in this paper, on marriage, fertility, and measures of women's agency. Our analyses of marriage begin with an examination of age at (first) marriage, relying on the life events history in the questionnaire and utilizing survival analyses (Kaplan-Meier estimators) to account for the fact that many individuals were not, at the time of the survey, married, and may never be married. We also provide demographic measures of the sex ratio by age (offset by the five-year typical difference in spousal age) as a key measure of the marriage market. A number of other marriage outcomes are examined as well, including educational and age differences between spouses (for those whose husbands were present in the household), living arrangements at marriage, and kin relations with spouses. Work and marriage are linked using the labor market history as well as the life events calendar. Contemporaneous reports of work hours and hours spent in domestic chores and care work during the week are examined in relation to employment and work decisions. In examining fertility, we use the total fertility rate (TFR) based on the age specific fertility rate (ASFR) calculated from the fertility history section of the questionnaire for the years 2011-2013, the three years preceding the survey. To assess women's agency, we examine a series of questions about women's decision making and also their mobility. Throughout, we examine these outcomes in relation to a number of women's personal and household characteristics, including their age, education, current household wealth, region of residence, and location of residence (urban vs. rural). For brevity, we only highlight particularly notable relationships between characteristics and outcomes rather than attempt to report on all possible bivariate relationships.
Marriage Patterns

Trends in age at marriage
The steady and long-run nature of the rising age at marriage in Tunisia is readily apparent from Figure 1 , which shows the proportion of individuals married by selected ages for different birth cohorts and by sex. The proportion married by any given age has declined consistently for women and men across birth cohorts, with the possible exception of women married by age 39 among the most recent cohorts. While few men of any generation ever married before the age of 18, the proportion of women marrying before that age fell from nearly 25 percent for those born in the late 1950s to almost zero for those born post-1990. Similarly, while over 50 percent of women born in the 1950s were marrying by the age of 22, that proportion has fallen to less than 20 percent for those born post-1990. The proportion of women marrying by age 26 also declined sharply over the 1955 to 1980 birth cohorts, but appears to have stabilized for the cohorts born since the 1980s. The rise in male age at marriage is best exemplified by the proportion marrying by age 26 and 30, which fell from over 40 percent (age 26) and 75 percent (age 30) for those born in the 1950s, to less than 20 percent (age 26) and 50 percent (age 30) for those born post-1980. As in the case of women, the rate of decline in the proportion of men married by age 30 has slowed for men born after the late 1970s, suggesting a moderation of the trend toward rising age of marriage in Tunisia.
Correlates of age at marriage
Tunisians tend to marry at relatively older ages than in other countries in the region. Figure 2 shows the proportion of women and men married by each age by place of residence. Marriage was relatively early for a subset of Tunisian women under 60 in 2014, with 11 percent married by age 18 and about 28 percent married by age 21. In comparison, 21 percent of Egyptian women had been married by age 18 in 2012 (Salem, 2015) and 22 percent of Jordanian women had been married by that age in 2010 . Thus, while some Tunisian women married young, such an outcome was less common than in neighboring countries.
Conversely, a substantial proportion of Tunisian women will probably never marry. About 18 percent of Tunisian women had never married by age 40 and this proportion drops only somewhat by age 59, to 12 percent. In contrast, marriage among Tunisian men, although usually occurring later in life, is relatively higher, with only 12 percent never married by age 40 and 6 percent never married by age 59. The fact that marriage is not universal among Tunisians and especially among Tunisian women is not a recent phenomenon. Rashad, Osman and Roudi-Fahimi (2005) using data from the PAPFAM survey report that 15 percent of women 35-39 in Tunisia were never married in 2001. Among Arab countries, only Algeria and Lebanon had a higher percentage of never-married women in that age group. This lack of universality of marriage among women is in stark contrast to Egypt, where 3 percent of women are never married by age 50 in 2012, and is more like Jordan, where 14 percent of women were never married by age 50 in 2010 (Krafft & Assaad, 2016) .
There are only small differences in the age of marriage by urban and rural residence or region. Early marriage is somewhat more common in rural areas, for both men and women, but the median age is similar in both locations, around 25 for women and 30-31 for men. The proportion of women married in rural areas starts to fall below what it is in urban areas by about age 25 and the proportion of rural women who will never marry exceeds that of urban women.
3
One of the reasons for a lower rate of marriage among women than among men by age 40 is that, given the typically five-year age gap between spouses, there is an excess of women relative to potential marriage partners. Figure 3 shows the ratio of women to men five years older, and Figure 4 additionally breaks down these ratios by urban versus rural place of residence. With the exception of the age categories from 5 to 19, the number of women exceeds the number of men in all age groups in both urban and rural locations. There is also evidence that these disparities are greater in rural areas. This pattern of sex ratios is not likely to be driven by disparities in sex ratios at birth, but rather by the age structure of the population in Tunisia (see Assaad, Ghazouani, & Krafft, 2016) and the persistence of the male-female age difference at marriage. 4 While historically the rapid growth of the population led to there being more young women than men five years older, as fertility has declined, the excess will reverse for future generations coming into the marriageable age.
Educational attainment has a stronger relationship with age of marriage for women than for men. As shown in Figure 5 , women's median age at marriage increases by 7 years (from 23 to 30) when their attainment goes from illiterate to the university long cycle level and above. In contrast, men's median age at marriage only increases by four years (from 29 to 33) over the same range of educational attainment. The effect goes beyond the mechanical effect of marriage being delayed by the fact that individuals stay in school longer since the age of marriage of educated individuals exceeds by a wide margin the typical age of graduation from university.
Educational hypergamy and hypogamy
In line with the relatively large historical gender gaps in educational attainment in Tunisia (Assaad, Ghazouani, & Krafft, 2016) , the traditional pattern, as in many other parts of the developing world, had been one of educational hypergamy, i.e. one where women tend to marry more educated spouses. Coupled with the substantial age gap between spouses, this educational gap likely reduced bargaining power for women within the institution of marriage. However, rapidly rising levels of educational attainment among women in Tunisia and the closing, if not reversal, of the gender gap in education are quickly changing this long-standing pattern. 5 As shown in Figure 6 , 55 percent of women with university long cycle education or above who married in the 10 years prior to the survey are in hypogamous marriages, meaning that they are more educated than their spouses. This share goes up to 68 percent for women with short cycle university education. Overall, nearly one third of Tunisian women are now more educated than their spouses and a further 39 percent have the same level of education as their spouse. These developments are likely to continue shaping women's relative empowerment within marriage.
Age gap between spouses
As discussed above, there is a gap of about five years in the median age at marriage for men and women in Tunisia. Similarly, the mean spousal age gap for all married women aged 39-59 (born in 1955-1975) was 6 years. This compares to a mean spousal age gap of 7 years in Egypt (Assaad & Krafft, 2015a) . Despite the persistently lopsided ratios of the number of women relative to the number of men five years older discussed above (see Figure 3 and Figure 4 ), there has not been a strong tendency for this age gap to narrow. As shown in Figure 7 , a smoothed line of the mean spousal age gap by wife's year of birth has fluctuated between 5 and 6 years between the 1955 birth cohort and the 1975 birth cohort. There has been, if anything, a slight increase in the gap over time. We refrain from including women younger than 39 in the graph since many of these women would not have been married by 2014, leading to potentially biased estimates due to selection into early marriage. Thus, with existing data it is not yet possible to confirm whether the trend toward a narrowing of the spousal age gap will occur among more recent cohorts to echo decreasing education gaps. Additional analyses among women married in the ten years preceding the survey indicate that there are only small differences in spousal age gaps by region, residence, or current household wealth. There are slightly smaller (5 year) gaps among those women with higher education compared to preceding levels.
Nuclear family residence & kin marriage
As discussed in Krafft (2015a, 2015b) , the increased incidence of nuclear family residence at marriage and reduced kin marriage are two common regional marital trends. While the data from one cross-sectional survey does not allow us to examine how these two dimensions changed over time in Tunisia, we can still explore how they vary with educational attainment and household socio-economic status. According to the TLMPS 2014, 84 percent of marriages taking place in the 10 years prior to the survey involved nuclear family residence arrangements and 14 percent of marriages were kin marriages. This compares to 68 percent in nuclear families and 27 percent kin marriages in Egypt in 2012, and 74 percent in nuclear families and 30 percent kin marriages in Jordan in 2010.
6 Based on these results Tunisia has decidedly more nuclear family and fewer kin marriages than either Egypt or Jordan. An ideal of an egalitarian, nuclear family, supported by Tunisia's family law (Charrad, 2008) has likely contributed to this pattern. While the proportion of nuclear family living arrangements at marriage are high throughout (at least 79 percent), there is a marked increase with educational attainment, with those having a university long cycle degree or above having a 93 percent rate of nuclear family residence patterns. Similarly, the proportion of kin marriages drops sharply with education, going from 7 21 percent among illiterates to 3 percent among those with university long cycle education and above.
Patterns of nuclear family residence and kin marriage exhibit similar patterns with households' current wealth quintiles 7 (Figure 9 ) as they do with educational attainment. These two dimensions of socio-economic status are likely to be linked. Women currently living in poorer households are less likely to have had nuclear living arrangements at marriage (72 percent of those in the poorest quintile) and more likely to marry their kin (24 percent) than those with higher wealth levels. Among those in the richest quintile of households, 95 percent lived in a nuclear family household at marriage, and just 4 percent married kin. In line with socioeconomic gradients, urban areas have more nuclear residence and less kin marriage than rural areas, and regional patterns are in line with urban-rural disparities (not shown).
Work and marriage transitions
Marriage can substantially affect women's decision to work. Figure 10 shows, relative to the year women got married, the patterns of employment up to ten years before and ten years after marriage, for women married since 1994. While a rising share of women works in the private sector in the years leading up to marriage, this proportion drops by about 20 percent at marriage, from around 11 percent to 9 percent. In contrast, the shares in public sector and non-wage work, although lower, continue to rise. This is likely due to the greater stability and desirability of public sector work and the greater ability on the part of married women to reconcile such work and non-wage work with their domestic responsibilities. The proportion of women working for wages in the private sector in Tunisia begins to climb again a few years after marriage, suggesting that women in Tunisia return to private sector wage work after their children have reached a certain age. These results are in sharp contrast to trends in Egypt and Jordan. In Egypt, women's private sector wage work drops by more than 60 percent (from 5 percent to 2 percent) and only recovers marginally after marriage by less than 1 percentage point (p.p.). In Jordan, the proportion of women in private sector wage work drops by nearly 40 percent at marriage (from 9 percent to 5.5 percent), and then continues to fall further after marriage rather than recover (Assaad, Krafft, & Selwaness, 2016) . A shift towards families' acceptance of married women's work outside the home in Tunisia (Labidi, 2008) , particularly a shift that is stronger than in other contexts, may be a contributing factor to women's return to work after marriage and childbearing in Tunisia.
One of the reasons women may work less after marriage is the double burden of domestic and market work responsibilities, as demonstrated in Figure 11 . Market work here is defined as work either for pay (wage work) or non-wage work to produce a good exchanged on the market (self-employment, being an employer, or working unpaid in a family business). Market work does not include subsistence labor (work solely for own consumption). Domestic responsibilities here are defined to include care work and domestic chores. 8 Once married, women spend more hours per week in domestic responsibilities. Before marriage, women in wage employment spent 7 hours in domestic work, compared to 10 for those not employed, but this rises to 20 hours of domestic work once married. Hours spent on market work are lower for wage employed married women compared to single women (40 hours per week versus 46 hours per week). Hours in non-wage employment are also somewhat lower (38 versus 40). Notably, there is very little difference in terms of number of hours (a difference of 3-4 hours) between the domestic work burdens of those married women who are employed and not employed, such that women are facing a "second shift" of domestic responsibilities regardless of their market work status.
Fertility
Trends in fertility
Tunisia has progressed through the entirety of its demographic transition over the past four decades and has now achieved replacement fertility rates. 9 As recently as the late 1970s, the TFR in Tunisia was as high as six children per woman. Fertility declined rapidly throughout the 1980s, with the TFR reaching 3.4 children per woman by 1990 (Figure 12) . After a temporary slowdown in fertility decline in the early 1990s, the rapid decline in fertility resumed and the TFR fell from 3.3 in 1992 to the replacement level of 2.1 in 1999. It stabilized at roughly that level until 2009, when it started to slowly inch upward, reaching 2.2 in 2012. Based on data from the TLMPS, we estimate the TFR to be 2.11 in 2014. In effect, Tunisia had completed its demographic transition by the end of the 1990s and has now reached a new equilibrium at replacement level fertility.
Correlates of fertility
Fertility is still somewhat higher in rural areas than in urban areas, with a rural TFR of 2.3 compared to 2.0 for urban areas. These urban-rural differences in fertility also manifest themselves in different timing of births in women's life cycle. As shown in Figure 13 , agespecific fertility rates are higher at younger ages in rural areas, reflecting the earlier incidence of marriage in these areas. Teen fertility is low in Tunisia, but three times higher in rural areas than in urban areas. Urban fertility rates reach their peak at the 25-29 age group and then decline thereafter, but the rural fertility rate continues to be fairly high through the 35-39 age group.
The regional pattern of fertility in Tunisia is instructive as well for identifying where, geographically, population growth is occurring (Figure 14) . The Greater Tunis region already has below replacement fertility rates of 1.7 children per woman. In contrast, the highest fertility rates are in the less developed and less populous South East region (TFR of 2.5). The second highest fertility rates (TFR of 2.3) are in the inland North West region, which is nearly 60 percent rural (See Table 1 in Assaad, Ghazouani, and Krafft (2016) ) and the North East. The other predominantly rural region, Center West, has an intermediate TFR of 2.2, similar to Center East.
As is the case elsewhere in the developing world, fertility rates are strongly linked to women's educational attainment. What is somewhat surprising about Tunisia, however, is that even small differences in attainment are associated with large differences in fertility behavior. As shown in Figure 15 , the TFR declines from 2.9 to 1.9 just with the acquisition of literacy, although this may be due to the fact that the "read and write" category is a fairly small category for which the TFR is estimated with less precision. Nonetheless, the declining fertility gradient with education is quite apparent at higher levels of education, with the TFR falling well below replacement for long cycle (university and above) graduates, the fastest growing educational category among Tunisian women.
Women's Agency
The combination of increasing educational attainment, a falling, if not reversing, educational gap among spouses, more equitable and autonomous marriage arrangements, increased economic participation, and falling fertility are likely to increase the agency of Tunisian women within their own households. We examine in this section indicators of women's decisionmaking as well as measures of physical mobility and autonomy as manifestations of women's empowerment and agency. We further examine the way in which these elements of agency correlate with women's backgrounds.
Decision-making
Because there are few past studies that measured women's decision-making in various spheres of household activity in Tunisia, we are unable to show how these measures have changed over time, but we can examine how these measures vary along dimensions of residential location, education, and socio-economic status. Figure 16 shows the percentage of urban and rural women involved in a variety of different decisions (either making the decision alone or jointly with family). It is clear from the results shown in the figure that women in urban areas are more involved in household decision-making than rural women, whatever the type of decision. In both environments, women are more involved in decisions that affect them in the strict sense, such as selecting and purchasing their own clothes, their needs for health care, or visiting friends and extended family. They are less involved in decisions that involve other members of the household, although in urban areas in particular were more involved in decisions about children.
There are modest differences in women's decision-making involvement by the wealth quintile of the household. Higher-wealth households tend to have slightly greater involvement by women (Figure 17 ). Differences by wealth are, however, fairly modest, suggesting limited socio-economic variation in women's decision-making.
Women's relative socio-economic status within the household may be more important than the overall socio-economic status of the household. As Figure 18 shows, the proportion of women involved in decision-making is higher when her spouse is relatively less educated relative to her own education level. She is less empowered when her spouse has the same education, and even less empowered when her spouse is more educated. These results suggest that with the rapid increase in urban living and the closing if not reversal of the education gap between spouses in Tunisia, women are becoming and will continue to become more empowered in shaping the decisions that affect their own wellbeing as well as that of their families.
Mobility
Along with women's ability to make decisions, another dimension of agency is whether women are able to leave the house independently. We measure whether women are mobile in terms of whether they can just go to a variety of places, or can go after informing their family (but not needing to seek permission). Figure 19 examines mobility to a number of destinations by region. Notably, for no region or location are the majority of women able to go everywhere independently or just by informing their family. Further, there is substantial regional variation in women's mobility, with women in Greater Tunis and the North East typically the most mobile, although women in the South East have the greatest mobility to visit family or friends. This pattern likely reflects, in part, less mobility in rural areas, where going to a number of locations would be a much more substantial endeavor. There was much greater variation, in terms of mobility, among women in different localities and regions than across women of different wealth levels or educational attainments. Disparities in mobility by region thus may reflect local norms or dimensions of physical access intersecting with norms.
Conclusions
Women in Tunisia have made progress in a number of inter-related spheres that have contributed to them having greater control over their lives and a greater ability to contribute to the wellbeing of their families. Not only have they made huge advances in educational attainment, to the point that the educational attainment of young women now exceeds that of young men, they have increased their economic participation (Assaad, Ghazouani, & Krafft, 2016) . In regard to marriage, as shown in this paper, Tunisian women are definitely marrying later, primarily living in autonomous nuclear family residence arrangements at marriage, not very likely to marry their kin, and marrying husbands that are closer to them or even lower than them in education. They are also having fewer children, giving them the opportunity to go back to work after raising their children and to invest more in the human capital of their children. All these patterns are stronger in urban areas and among more educated women and similar, likely related patterns are observed for women's agency. With both urban residence and women's education increasing rapidly in Tunisia, we only expect these trends to continue and to become stronger over time. As they have in many other contexts, these trends have the potential to unleash a virtuous cycle of investments in human capital, increased productivity, and greater gender equality that will greatly contribute to the wellbeing of the Tunisian population in the future. 
